Volume-I, Issue-IV, March 2025
Volume-I, Issue-IV, January, 2025 |
Received: 24.03.2025 | Send for Revised: 24.03.2025 | Revised Received: 29.03.2025 | Page No: -991-997 |
| Accepted: 30.03.2025 | Published Online: 31.03.2025 | ||
DOI: 10.69655/atmadeep.vol.1.issue.04W.095 | |||
প্রমাণ প্রসঙ্গে নাগার্জুন: একটি বিশ্লেষণাত্মক আলোচনা প্রিয়াঙ্কা মুখার্জ্জী, গবেষক, দর্শন বিভাগ, বর্ধমান বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়, পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত |
Nagarjuna on pramaṇa: An Analytical discussion Priyanka Mukherjee, Ph. D. Scholar, Dept. of philosophy, The University of Burdwan, West Bengal, India | ||
ABSTRACT | ||
In Indian Philosophy, ‘pramāṇa’ refers to ‘means of valid knowledge’. Most of the schools admit Pramāṇa to demonstrate the reality of mundane or transmundane object. In Gautama’s ‘Nyāyasūtra’ knowledge is considered as something that leads to attain the highest good, i.e. liberation. It proves that how far the concept of pramāṇa is precise to the Naiyāyikas. On the other hand, Nāgārjuna, the founder of Mādhyamika school, advances arguments to dismantle the Nyāya concept of pramāṇa after the philosophical treatise like Vigrahavyāvartanī and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. For him, if we accept that pramāṇas are required to establish prameyas, the justificatory grounds of pramāṇas should be established first. This paper is a humble attempt to show how does Nāgārjuna using logical analysis try to prove the Nyāya concept of Pramāṇa ‘non-sensical’. It is also equal interesting to examine the replies deployed by the cognitivists’ standpoint to the sceptic approach. | ||
Keywords:
|